The Decision at Wilmington

Cornwallis arrived at Wilmington in April 1781 with an army that had won its last battle by losing a quarter of itself. Guilford Courthouse was technically a victory — Greene retreated, the British held the field. The casualty count made it something else.

He had two choices. South: reinforce British posts in South Carolina and Georgia, try to hold the interior positions that were already beginning to buckle under Greene's pressure. North: march into Virginia, seize the Chesapeake, cut the supply lines that fed Patriot operations throughout the south.

He chose Virginia. His reasoning was coherent: Virginia produced the men and supplies that sustained Patriot resistance; hit Virginia hard enough and the south would collapse from its roots. It was a strategic argument, not a reckless gamble.

What he didn't calculate was what Greene would do when he marched away. Greene turned south the day after Cornwallis left Wilmington. With the British army in Virginia, Greene could pick off British interior posts in the Carolinas one by one — Ninety Six, Eutaw Springs, a dozen smaller positions. By the time Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in October, the British position in the south that he had been trying to secure was already gone.

The decision was made at Wilmington. It ended the war.