Danbury

Danbury, Connecticut: The Supply Depot That Burned and the Raid That Backfired

By the spring of 1777, the American Revolution had settled into a grueling contest of logistics. Armies needed gunpowder, salted meat, tents, and rum just as urgently as they needed muskets and courage. The British high command understood this arithmetic perfectly, and it was this understanding that brought fire and devastation to the quiet inland town of Danbury, Connecticut—a place that had never seen a pitched battle but had become, almost invisibly, one of the most important supply nodes sustaining the Continental cause in the northern theater. Connecticut was essential to supplying the war effort during the American Revolution because its coastline harbored privateers that captured almost 500 British ships and more importantly, vast stores of food, supplies, and ammunition.

Additionally, it provided more troops to George Washington's army than any other state except Massachusetts. What happened at Danbury in late April 1777, and the chain of events it set in motion, constitutes one of the most dramatic and instructive episodes of the entire war: a story of strategic vulnerability, civilian suffering, improvised resistance, and unlikely heroism that still resonates nearly two and a half centuries later.

Danbury's role in the Revolution began not with a bang but with a bureaucratic decision. The Danbury depot had been established in 1776 by order of the Second Continental Congress, and it primarily served forces located in the Hudson River valley.

When General George Washington ordered that Danbury serve as a supply depot for the Continental army in early 1777, he based his decision on the town's importance as a regional trading and manufacturing center, served by several major roads. Danbury was an attractive choice: it sat roughly twenty-five miles inland from Long Island Sound, connected by passable roads to the main army but shielded—or so it seemed—by rough, hilly terrain. Over the following months, warehouses and barns in and around the town filled steadily with provisions that the Continental Army could ill afford to lose. By April 1777, Danbury held an estimated 4,000 barrels of beef and pork, 5,000 pairs of shoes, 1,600 tents, a large quantity of hospital stores, and significant reserves of gunpowder and cartridges. For an army perpetually on the edge of material collapse, these stores represented months of painful accumulation. Protecting the army's supplies was a militia regiment of 100 men under Colonel Jedediah Huntington and a militia company of 50 men under the command of Colonel Joseph P. Cooke. The force at their disposal was woefully inadequate for a determined assault.

The British, well informed by Loyalist intelligence networks that threaded through Connecticut's divided communities, knew precisely what Danbury held and resolved to destroy it. Howe had learned of the depot's existence through a spy working for British Indian agent Guy Johnson, and he had also met with some success in an earlier raid against the Continental Army outpost at Peekskill, New York.

Looking to counter a series of recent defeats at Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, the British commander in North America—William Howe—decided to take the war to nearby Connecticut and New York.

Howe believed that the destruction of American supply depots located in those states would give his army a distinct advantage over Washington's force and compel it to withdraw or disperse.

The man chosen to lead the expedition was Major General William Tryon, the former royal governor of New York, who was given a temporary promotion as "major general of the provincials" in spring 1777. Tryon was determined to plan meticulously. He demanded detailed military planning, 1,700 experienced troops, diversionary actions against Peekskill and most important, to be guided by the 300-man Royal and Honorary Prince of Wales Loyal American Volunteers, largely raised in Fairfield County.

His force would be led by locals, who knew the roads and the political sympathies of their neighbors.

The landing force consisted of 1,500 regulars drawn from the 4th, 15th, 23rd, 27th, 44th, and 64th regiments, 300 Loyalists from the Prince of Wales American Regiment led by Montfort Browne, and a small contingent of the 17th Light Dragoons, all led by Generals Sir William Erskine and James Agnew.

A fleet was assembled consisting of 12 transports, a hospital ship, and some small craft, all under the command of Captain Henry Duncan.

Command of the entire operation was given to General Tryon, and the fleet sailed from New York on April 22, 1777.

Simultaneously, a diversionary force of frigates sailed up the Hudson to prevent American reinforcements from concentrating against the raiding party.

The voyage did not go smoothly. For two days the troops waited out a headwind in discomfort aboard ship before they could proceed the remaining 30 miles.

Under the command of Captain Henry Duncan, British ships delivered 1,500 British regulars and American Loyalists to Compo Beach (in modern-day Westport) at 5 p.m. on April 25, 1777.

A light rain fell as the soldiers carried their supplies ashore and, before midnight, began their march to Danbury on the Redding Road.

Sighted by patriots who then sent messengers to spread the alarm, the soldiers met with only light resistance.

Some surmised that the Danbury supply depot would be the chief target, and at 3:00 A.M. on April 26 a courier rode into Danbury with a warning.

Another arrived at 6:00 A.M. to confirm the likelihood of attack.

Many townspeople fled in advance of the British column. Doctor Isaac Foster, in charge of the Continental army's medical supplies, moved them to New Milford.

The 150 men under Huntington and Cooke, busily removing what supplies remained, soon retreated, and the British soldiers commenced their raid.

Arriving in Danbury shortly before three that afternoon, Tryon set up his headquarters in Nehemiah Dibble's home on South Street.

The British did not have wagons to remove the supplies, however, and they knew militia units were gathering to attack, so they ordered the supplies destroyed. They removed supplies from the Anglican church building and set them afire in the street and torched twenty-two storehouses as well.

The British spared the houses of Loyalists, however.

Before their departure early the next morning, the British destroyed 4,000 to 5,000 barrels of pork, beef, and flour